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The following text is the result of a deconstructive reading of two rather concrete works of E. Husserl that is «The 
Beginning of Geometry» and Chapter One of the second part of «Logical Researches», which is titled «Expression 
and Meaning». Thereat, one can understand that the given work is not possible without some general presentation 
of Phenomenology as a philosophical «method of original obviousness production from pre-scientific entities of 
the cultural world»2. In other words, we shall positively speak about metaphysical (and first of all about ontological) status 
of ideal objects, about their production in the acts of intentionality and identification of the «very same», and about some 
invariants of thought [“même”]3, or still wider – about seeing the One in multiple. In this sense, geometrical and 
logical objects of identities are considered by E. Husserl only as examples of «the ideal objectness» on the whole, 
and the phenomenologist should spend all his intellectual efforts in order to detect and to describe them.
If we are courageous enough to follow the thread of an argument by E. Husserl himself, who, in his turn (at least, 
originally and to a large extent), repeats the famous meditations of Descartes, and then, if we methodically doubt 
everything, what can be doubt about at least theoretically4, we shall quite soon come to the apodictic authenticity 
of the only Cogito, and consequently, to a radically solipsistic point of view. Even upon the most strict and thor-
ough phenomenological reflection, and though, the very structure of Cogito still turns out to be exceedingly filled 
by content, we cannot yet help avoiding epistemological solipsism, in case we consistently (and, we may say, quite 
justifiably) stick to the principle of cogitatum qua cogitatum. That is why in «The Beginning of Geometry» E. Hus-
serl rather fairly raises the question of, how it has become possible, that the image, which having been constituted 
by the subject and belonging to the psychological sphere, acquires objective, or, at any case, inter-subjective be-
ing as some ideal objectness, which, having become geometrical, is already real not only psychically, though it has 
psychically come into being?
Keywords: algorithm, consciousness, contextualism, difference, cultural evolution, force, meme, mimesis, sense, 
repetition, replication.
«Neither world, nor its part, but its “sense” is revealed». 
 E. Husserl: Phenomenology. 
(British Encyclopedia Article 
The source: “The Logos” journal № 1/1991)
* Corresponding author E-mail address: daemon.laplasa@gmail.com
1 © Siberian Federal University. All rights reserved
2 «It is clear that the method of original obviousness production from pre-scientific entities of the cultural world must be 
written down and expressed in set sentences yet before the appearance of geometry, and further that the ability of transfer-
ring these sentences from the vague linguistic understanding into the clarity of reactivation of its obvious meaning, must be 
constantly delivered and deliver itself». E. Husserl. “The Beginning of Geometry”. P.227-228.
3 J.Derrida. Introduction. Ib.P.9 (même Fr. – the same, very same, identical; philosophic. thought invariant).
4 I.e. in everything; nevertheless, one can think negation/ non-existence of whatever without any contradictions. It is interest-
ing, that already Leibniz notes that to think one’s existence is possible without any cogito: the consideration «I do not think, 
consequently I exist» does not oppose cogito ergo sum by Descartes. Though, it is also true that in the first case I can know 
nothing about it.
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The kind of effect, which was made over 
Descartes by the phenomenological reduction, is 
similar to that one, which we have just hurriedly 
performed, and is today’s general place in the 
history of philosophy: as it is known, for a score 
of reasons Descartes could not keep inside the 
phenomenological setting of conscious and had to 
rebuild the world, wherein not only all the things 
went to their «natural» places, but the Creator 
himself turned out to be incapable to deceive. 
Though, already in the works of Descartes we 
find out one authentically phenomenological 
principal, which is excessively efficient for our 
further research work. Here is a quotation from 
«The Third Consideration»: «But, it becomes 
clear thanks to the natural light of the mind, that 
in the cumulative producing reason there must be 
at least as much reality, as there is in the action 
of this very reason»1. Working successively with 
the ideas of material things, animals, angels, and 
other people, of himself, and, finally, of the God, 
Descartes finds more reality in the idea of the latter, 
than in him himself. And other ideas, whatever 
complex their structure is, Descartes brilliantly 
decomposes into finest moduses of his own cogito 
(cumulative aesthesis, or apperception), thus 
reducing them to the final number of archetypes 
- primary ideas, wherein all the rest of reality is 
«formally» contained2. It seems quite natural 
for Descartes, that he does not need anybody 
else, in order to produce such categories (ideas) 
as extension, density, form, movement, number 
and substance (i.e. practically everything, with 
which help we usually estimate the outer world or 
the inner world of others). Moreover, Descartes 
considers the mentioned above categories in a 
maximum detail and a mistake is possible only 
in respect of colour, sound, taste, smell, warmth 
and cold, but it does not concern the authorship 
question. It is rather curious, that Descartes 
produces all the ideas by analogy. For example, to 
think a stone as a thing, or a substance, being able 
of an independent being (compare with «to exist 
means to exist separately» Aristotle), means only 
to grant the stone just the same attribute, which has 
been already set in the process of transcendental 
reduction in relation to Ego: the only difference is 
the following: «I» is a thinking object, and «the 
stone» is an extended thing. In one word, there is 
really what to become afraid of …
E. Husserl seems to move much more 
thoroughly and much more courageously. Having 
collected the outer world «in parentheses», he 
thoroughly researches the subjective world of 
feelings, which exact record takes into account 
methodological limitations (phenomenological 
epoch and phenomenological reduction), placed 
on the language and on the point of view. This 
record is appealed to provide the most authentic 
«phenomena» knowledge, which has been gained 
in such a way, and to assure that the knowledge 
has not any preconditions. Thus, knowledge 
turns out to be possible only in relation to the 
subjective experience of an object (to that, what 
has been experienced) or to the feeling of the 
experience of an object (to the way it has been 
experienced), as far as «the unit of sense», which 
I testify about (I am always supposed to do it 
seriously and with full responsibility), is the only 
real thing (at any rate, for me) independently on 
the fact, if the object is real or not . It turns out 
to be extremely important that the feelings do not 
1 R. Descartes. 2 volumes set, volume 2 p.33.
2 «Since, as much this objective modus of being corresponds to the ideas of their own nature, so much the formal modus of be-
ing corresponds to the reasons of the ideas also of their own nature – at least, primary and basic reasons». Ib. P.35. We should 
remind that the notions «objective» and «formal» are used by Descartes in accordance with the scholastic tradition, and 
precisely, as «existing in idea» and «existing in being» correspondingly. Sometimes, he also uses the notion of “eminenter” 
as «existing in some principal», whereof the given existence acquires its being. In Russian editions this notion is translated 
as «jeminentno» or «po preimushhestvu».
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happen to me chaotically, but they have an open 
structure, for example, in time. The structure of 
every feeling is intentional, and different moduses 
of intentionality form rather different sub-types. 
Imagination, recollection, perception, judgment, 
estimation, striving – this is far non-exhaustive 
list of feelings, and each of them has its own 
and a rather steady scheme. These are so called 
«domains of reality», or regions of the Existing, 
each of them requires to be seized in its own way 
in the field of phenomenological experience and 
to be expressed with due consideration of their 
peculiar axiomatic pattern, which we are just 
to discover. In fact, we experience number and 
pain in as different moduses, as the senses of 
numerical and social inequality. The number of 
examples is unlimited, but here it is important, 
that each of them has its own intentional horizon 
and its own aprioristic transcendental structure1. 
And in spite of the fact that E. Husserl seems to 
allege as of non-reducible peculiarity of types and 
forms of intentional feelings, so of their historicity 
(that would make it much closer to «symbolical 
forms» or «values» of Neo-Kantianism), in his 
texts we also find an indispensable requirement to 
ascend from establishing of any historical fact to 
some invariant, absolute A priori2. It means that 
my psychological experience, perception, and 
imagination and etc. remain the same, what they 
have been before by their form and content, but 
now I consider them as structures, which are as 
well transcendental structures of any conscious on 
the whole3. 
So, strictly following the rule of apodictic 
obviousness, we face the problem of sense formation 
as it is, of its production as a generally significant 
sense, and also the problem of its translation, i.e. 
we find ourselves in a strictly anthropological 
domain, wherein, finally, utterance is reigning, 
which first of all has been taken from the point of 
view of expression and what has been expressed4. 
Let us firstly have a look at those decisions, 
which E. Husserl suggests to us. He supposes 
that on the whole sense would not be possible 
without some «original and actual self-presence 
of the first product in its original obviousness»5. 
Strictly speaking, it is not quite clear, what such 
«self-presence of the product» means. Moreover, 
such merging of notions of «presence» as of 
entity (when «the given» is perceived more or 
less passively) and of «product» (as a process or a 
result of some vigorous activity) is typical for most 
works of E. Husserl. This ascending to Descartes 
dualism is already overcome by Kant in «The 
First Criticism». There he says that the objects are 
given to us by means of feelings, and by means 
of notions we can think them. But finally, he is 
known to adjust the discrepancies only by means 
of a radical thesis introducing into his philosophy: 
laws do not at all exist in phenomena, but only in 
relation to a subject.6 And to be more precise, even 
Kant does not adjust the mentioned discrepancy. 
1 «Essences and interrelations, which find their bases right in those essences, and directly perceived in essential intuition, and 
it (phenomenology – my comment) descriptively expresses them in essential notions and essential utterances, subordinated 
to certain laws. Each of such utterances is aprioristic in the highest sense of this word». See E. Husserl. Logical Researches. 
V.2.Introduction.
2 Vide supra Descartes’ archetype.
3 «The infinite task of description of the universe aprioristic structures is fulfilled by means of bringing of all the pieces of 
objectiveness about their transcendental “source” and may be considered as one of the functions of the universal science 
building. Any branch of the universal science, including the positive one, must be formed on its aprioristic bases». E. Husserl. 
Phenomenology. The British Encyclopedia Article. 
4 «All the theoretical researches, though they are surely and in no way conducted in the acts of expressing or even in full utter-
ances, nevertheless are finally finished in utterances». E. Husserl. Logical Researches. V.2.Introduction.
5 E. Husserl. The Beginning of Geometry P.219
6 «Categories are the essence of notion, a priori prescribing laws to phenomena, that is to the nature as the summation of all the 
phenomena». I.Kant. Criticism of the Clear Mind. P.116(my comments in cursive)
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We suppose that it cannot be solved at all, and the 
main thing is that there is no necessity in it. We 
simply need, like Kant, to have enough courage 
to go up to the very end, having taken one of the 
sides of this seeming discrepancy, and precisely, as 
Kant calls it, the side of «imagination productive 
ability», or «power», which will be much later 
conceptualized by G. Deleuze. Precisely this is 
not done by E. Husserl, as it was not done by 
Descartes sometime.
Taking into account the mentioned 
observations, the work of E. Husserl acquires 
much more radical, and at the same time, most 
finished sight. Being first produced by the subject, 
the objectiveness of what-has-just-happened is 
nothing without the persistent work of repeating, 
for example, as a recollection. And if the past 
feeling is actively re-experienced in the result 
of the produced recollection, so thus, as E. 
Husserl says, for the first time there appears the 
objectiveness of identity in original «covering» 
[Deckung] [même]. «Besides, the ability of 
formation voluntary repetition turns out to be set 
in the chain of repetitions upon the obviousness 
of its equality (the equality covering)»1. (Here 
introduced by Husserl, the term Deckung appears 
to be a big success. It should be understood as in 
the sense of some material security, or guarantee 
of covering the bill, so in the sense of some power 
to discharge the pledge, or to keep the given word.) 
Then, from the point of view of E. Husserl, the 
linguistic community comes into action, Others, 
who are capable of understanding2. So, having 
originally belonged to the sphere of the psychical, 
the product of some equality [même] becomes 
obvious for others as well, who, though, have not 
at all got rid of the necessity of their own actual 
performing of the objectivizing activity. On the 
contrary, «we obviously perceive the pure law and 
learn that it is based on the pure forms of thinking. 
Though, this obviousness is connected to the 
meaning of words in a true and actual performance 
of the judgment, expressing the law»3. Thus, not 
losing their original equality, productions can 
be spread with no limit, moreover, numerously 
reproduced images will be not perceived as similar 
ones, but as one common in the given chain of 
such understanding repetitions. On the other hand, 
E. Husserl insists that ontological status of such 
ideal entities cannot be the result of some concrete 
epoch: then in such a case any outstanding thinker, 
like the notorious «geometer - founder», could 
be understood only by the people, who share the 
understanding conditions, being pre-described by 
the epoch, with him. And though, to Husserl’s 
mind, history on the whole «is nothing else, 
but a living movement of integrity and mutual 
inbuiltness of original sense formation and sense 
setting»4. Nevertheless, we should differentiate 
authentically invariant senses [même] from 
associatively appearing falsifications, having 
been lost in tradition or growing in the condition 
of constant logical construction and reproduction. 
Though, these falsifications pretend to be the 
remnants of some true sense, they still do not 
possess it at all, or need thorough working in order 
to be brought to originally obvious source. 
To Husserl’s mind, this is the only way 
to realize his announced requirement of 
preconditionlessness. And philosophy, as a 
rigorous science, must be organized in accordance 
with this requirement. Nevertheless, it is quite 
easy to find out, that such a requirement is unreal 
and exuberant. Whatever limitations we impose 
1 E. Husserl. The Beginning of Geometry. P.219
2 «In the mutual linguistic perception contact the original production and the product of the same subject will be actively post-
understood (nachverstanden) by others». Ibid.
3 E. Husserl. Logical Researches. V.2.Introduction.
4 E. Husserl. The Beginning of Geometry. p.235.
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on the methods of phenomenological descriptions 
and expressions, our «productive capability of 
imagination» will inevitably and helpfully suggest 
us to choose these or those «schemes» (images) of 
closed, though, possibly, and whatever large (then 
we are inclined to speak about infinity) volume, 
wherein we «obviously» or «vaguely» see 
something, or point at something («announcing»): 
then we should hardly be wondered that «the idea» 
of such a volume is paced in the same volume. 
This is the way, how the self-contradictory 
concept of «conscious» is formed, the concept 
which is a direct analogy of «the set of all sets», 
and which is axiomatically prohibited inside the 
theory of sets itself, i.e. really preconditionlessly1. 
The given paradox seems to be unsurpassable, 
only if we fail to stop thinking «vertically», and it 
does not matter, whether we ascend to the source 
or, vice verse, descend into the obscure kingdom 
of archetypes. Here, we need a radical and clinical 
gesture of refusal from the event depth and 
release. And then there is no more any implicit 
or highest sense, there are simply various senses 
and they are given «with evidence» all together, 
on one and the same surface2. In the linguistic 
analytical philosophy, the given point of view 
is called deductive contextualism (inferential 
contextualism). Its main idea is the following: 
communicative sphere represents not a strict 
hierarchy, but a variety of mutually non-reducible 
contexts, differing by their deductive structure: 
what can be formulated and substantiated in one 
context that can be a basic assumption in another 
one. In this sense, the rigid requirements, raised 
by philosophers- skeptics to our knowledge, very 
often turn out to be simply irrelevant. In his «Logic-
Philosophical Tractate» Wittgenstein wittily 
points at the following circumstance: «Skepticism 
is not unanswerable, but is obviously senseless, 
as far as it doubts there, where one cannot put 
questions»3. On the whole, he is sure that we 
make one and the same mistake, supposing, that 
there is something, what we cannot see from the 
outside, and where we cannot peep inside either, 
and that there are some new facts. In reality, all the 
facts, which we are interested in, are just before 
us. And moreover: «no part of our experience 
is aprioristic. Everything, what we see, could be 
different. Everything we are able to describe, could 
be different either. There is no aprioristic order. 
Here, one can see that strictly drawn solipsism 
coincides with the pure realism. Solipsistic «I» 
collapses up to a non-extended point, and there 
remains only the reality, being associated with it»4. 
In other words, epistemological solipsism cannot 
be overcome theoretically, as Husserl wants it 
to be. It is a very existential event, some other 
«international horizon»5. This is not by chance, 
that Heidegger considers presence (Dasein) to be 
its own insignificant foundation and, at the same 
time, to be self-insignificant and that is why it is 
guilty of [causa] being by foundation of its own 
insignificance. To accept or not to accept this 
really catastrophic fact depends only upon me, 
only I turn out to be the reason [causa] of the 
sense, which comes to fruition for me this way, 
1 See any of axiomatic theories of sets, for example ZFC.
2 «We may say that what has earlier been depth, after having been extended, it has become width. Unlimited becoming is fully 
kept inside this inverted width. Depth is no more an advantage». G.Deleuze. The Logic of Meaning. P. 23
3 L.Wittgenstein. Logic-Philosophical Tractate. Moscow,1994. P.72
4 L.Wittgenstein. Logic-Philosophical Tractate. Moscow,1994. P.57
5 Ontology of Martin Heidegger in the highest degree successively realizes the phenomenological setting and phenomeno-
logical method, and at the same time, it is well-known, what an enormous shock it was for Husserl that his own work was 
published and dedicated to him by his «talented assistant». Such a continuation of phenomenology seemed to Husserl to be 
an annoying mistake. In one of his letters he wrote «it is a real misfortune, that I have delayed the development of my (what a 
pity, I have to say so) transcendental phenomenology so much. And here a new generation, immersed to the lips in prejudice 
and captured by a devastating psychosis, is, the generation which won’t hear anything about the scientific philosophy».
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and not the other. I have nothing and no means to 
inform the other (what he would not be informed 
of, so to say, in other moduses), the same as he 
has no means and no reasons to understand me. 
«Monads do not have windows» is a brilliant 
move of Leibnitz in salvation of the problem of 
two substances1.
So, Husserl seriously supposes: «We say: such 
is the case. It goes without saying, that we would 
not do it, we would not be able to express it, if it 
did not appear before us this way; in other words, 
if we did not consider it. Acts of consideration are 
different depending on circumstances. Though, 
what the utterance means and what these acts 
consider is always the same, it is equal, in a strict 
sense of the word, it is just the same geometrical 
truth»2. But we shall still take the risk to invert 
the given thesis and state the following: I say – 
such is the case, and the circumstances of the case 
seem to be the same to me, until my expression 
is the same, equal in its strict sense. Thereat, 
«the utterance» must be perceived, firstly, in its 
broadest sense (if I have kept silence, then it does 
not mean that I have failed to express myself), and 
secondly – as one of my points of view (thereat, 
quite a certain one), of things (the state of things). 
I am the one, who produces and reproduces the 
sense, and this sense is always established as the 
only one, which is worth and deserves repeating 
and affirmation as «identical». Here, of course, 
we feel allusions to the famous Eternal Returning 
by Nietzsche, though this idea has been so many 
times and so variously interpreted by different 
commentators, that it requires additional and 
detailed explanations. So, what is returning after 
all? Our answer tunes in the answer of G.Deleuze: 
the difference is returning3. Thus, Difference, 
or selectiveness is an ontological attribute of 
Existence4. But at the same time, this attribute 
is also an ontological attribute of thinking. The 
statement - to think on the whole means to be 
able to differ – is also true. (It is not by chance 
that Hegel in his «Phenomenology of Spirit» 
defines self-conscious, or «pure «I» not only as a 
desire, but, first of all, as a differentiation of the 
undifferentiated5.) And only the Eternal Returning 
gives the thought a law of a truly independent 
will, being free from any sort of moral6: whatever 
I want, I must want it in such a way, that to 
avail against the irretrievability of the Eternal 
Returning of precisely this one, and not any other 
«something», i.e. against its incompleteness, or 
its selective eternity. Thus, we exclude any kinds 
of asthenic half-wills, for example, to make or to 
try something «at least once». Confirming some 
difference, some sense, which is worth of being, I 
establish myself as the Being7. That is why I need 
force, much force in order to be. Any utterance is 
a production and keeping of sense. Consequently, 
sense appears from relation of some forces, 
within which some forces act, and others counter-
act. Following Nietzsche, G.Deleuze himself 
differentiates vital, active forces, – the forces of 
conquest and fascination (robbery and gift), and 
1 Jacques Lacan also connected the ending of psycho-analytical process with the moment, when the patient «perceives his own 
being as not requiring any justification by the Alter in capital letter». Quotation from S. Zizek. Elevated Object of Ideology. 
Moscow,1999, p.119.
2 E. Husserl. Logical Researches. V.2, Research 1, Paragraph 11.
3 «…it is quite obvious, that repetition is an inevitable and substantiated action only in relation to that, what cannot be re-
placed». G.Deleuze. Differentiation and Repeating. St.Petersburg,1998. P. 12
4 L.Wittgenstein wrote just the same: «Two objects of identical logical form, if we distract from their outer features, differ from 
each other only as far as they are different». L.Wittgenstein. Logic-Philosophical Tractate. Moscow,1994. P. 7.
5 G.W.F Hegel. Phenomenology of Science. St. Petersburg 2002. P.91.
6 «If exchange is a criterion of commonness, then robbery or gift are criteria of repetition». G.Deleuze. Differentiation and 
Repeating. St. Petersburg, 1998. P. 12.
7 In fact, in the result of the fight, being led by two, to the last drop of one’s blood, that one becomes the lord, who chooses «to 
be», as far as he knows for sure, who he is. The slave is ready «not to be», in order to live – whatever his «I» is, but it is not 
worth of laying down his life for it. Thus, «the animal, who dares to promise» is given birth to.
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reactive forces (ajustment and ordering). In any 
case, any force is inevitably correlated with other 
forces and only within this relation it acquires its 
essence and its quality. 
We should note, that E. Husserl himself 
repeatedly «gives away» the same. For example, 
here is a quotation from «Logical Researches»: 
«All the objects and objective relations exist 
for us only because of the sense setting acts 
(Vermeinen), being essentially different from 
them, within which they (objects and objective 
relations) can be presented to us, and within 
which they oppose us precisely as set integrities»1. 
Though, in his striving for transcendental 
expansion (let it be within the limits, which are 
immanent to transcendental Ego), E. Husserl does 
not notice, or may be, does not want to notice a 
row of contradictions, which inevitably appear 
on the chosen way. The last of the contradictions, 
we would like to pay attention to in the given 
article, is the problem of renderableness, and to 
be precise, - of sense unrenderableness. And it 
can be solved both radically, and simply: with 
the help of re-denoting, i.e. with the help of 
introducing of the notion of «replication» instead 
of the notion of «rendering» into the discussion. 
In his time, Richard Dawkins, a modern English 
biologist-evolutionist and the author of the 
famous book «Selfish gene», presented such a 
non-traditional point of view of the «sense units» 
nature and also of units expansion principals and 
objective laws (1976), where for the first time 
he used the word «meme» [même] for denoting 
of one rather productive abstraction – certain 
«molecules of informational transmission». The 
term, invented by Dawkins, was constructed by 
analogy with the word «gene», first of all, for 
pointing at the resemblance of their functioning, 
and, simultaneously, for holding of connotation 
senses of memoria and mimesis. The most 
revolutionary point of Dawkins’ conception was 
and still is his fundamental conviction in the 
following: evolutional process does not depend 
on a certain special chemical substance, which 
study prerogative was assumed by geneticists in 
their time, but in the basis of the process there lies 
any transmission unit, able to self-reproduction 
[replication], and in this sense, gene is just an 
individual case, having its own place and fixed 
in biological evolution. Même is qualitatively 
different, but structurally and functionally equal 
to the gene of self-replicating unit of cultural 
sense transmission. Human conscious turns out 
to be its privileged carrier, and its multiplication 
field is language, semiotic systems, media, 
artefacts and etc. As examples of mêmes they 
usually give the ideas of number, wheel, counting, 
chess, calendar, and alphabet. Here, they can also 
include idioms, proverbs, jingles and sound-tags 
(for example, the first four notes of Beethoven’s 
symphony 5), cake recipes, cupola construction 
technologies and fashion. There are also such 
monsters as religion, the unconscious, freedom 
of word and the theory of conspiracy. But, they 
also include philosophical conceptions on the 
whole, prejudice, ideas of red and cold, love and 
pain2. In one word, they include senses (and also 
the idea of sense itself).
This conception has been given its further 
development in the fundamental work of D. 
Dennett, an American philosopher-cognitivist. In 
«Consciousness Explained» (1992) même is used 
for building of a well-developed philosophical 
theory of conscious, in which basis there also 
has been laid the idea of evolution as the utmost 
formal (i.e. neutral towards its carrier) algorithmic 
1 E. Husserl. Logical Researches. V.2, research 1.
2 We should note that not all the protagonists of the mêmetic theory agree with the possibilities of such an arbitrarily small 
division of même, which elements will be also mêmes. As a rule, we consider only those, to which the notion of copyright 
can be applied to.
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process. Dennett also refers the following qualities 
of algorithms to the most important ones: firstly, 
utmost possible simplicity of every algorithmic 
component and links between them [skeleton 
differentiation], and secondly, the result, being 
reproduced in all the cases [repetition]1. On any 
stage of cognition, nothing and nobody keeps me 
from considering of some revealed multitude as 
a solus and it’s every element – as a multitude2. 
As far as, staying inside the given paradigm, I am 
not limited by any substantial minimum, I can 
consider any natural and cultural situation on the 
whole as même, and any process - algorithmically, 
if only I think it methodically justified3. But, it is 
often far from it. For example, I can arbitrarily 
long and thoroughly «ascend» from my own 
feelings of the event of the given article writing, 
which has a unique sense for me, to the physics 
of the process, providing the finest algorithms of 
the computer, which I use for this work, but this 
very concrete event, which is very significant for 
me, I shall never find there. Though, it does not at 
all matter, that I shall fail to find there any other 
significant events – something like the event of 
«tunnel transition»4. It goes without saying that 
all the rest laws of natural selection also continue 
their action. As far as the number of conscious 
pieces is finite, and each of them is able to contain 
only a limited number of mêmes. That is why 
the main task of même is to occupy the maximal 
number of conscious pieces5. Thus, because of 
the competition, mêmes multiply, mutate, spread 
around and can be inherited. Their extremely 
important quality is their ability to exhaust and to 
neutralize any alternative mêmes, thus influencing 
on the même-competitors’ reproduction success. 
It is rather intriguing that those mêmes, which 
seem to be most perspective for their carriers, do 
not always manage to survive. And vice versa, 
those of them, which are able to outspread with 
higher speed, turn out to be more successful and 
numerous and finally they can be destructive for 
their carriers6. 
From the point of view of evolutionary 
approach to conscious, the need in somebody’s 
behavior expressed presentation appears only 
there and then, when there appears the possibility 
of communication, which is potentially mutual 
and simultaneously providing self-preservation. 
And absolute honesty cannot be the best tactics in 
the given circumstances, as far as it can be used by 
competitors. Consequently, one needs be as much 
sincere, that not to lose the confidence of others, 
and at the same time – deceitful enough, in order 
to have one’s own free choice. Further, any part of 
the organism carries in itself certain information 
and it should not at all be presented in the form of 
data structures in some part of the nervous system. 
By their essence, these or those preferences have 
already organized the body according to a certain 
1 See in detail: D. C. Dennett. Consciousness explained. N. Y. 1991 and D. C. Dennett. Darwin’s dangerous idea. N. Y., 
2003.
2 In his «Being and Event», Alain Badiou convincingly demonstrates the possibility of building of ontology, i.e. of all that, 
what is thinkable, from that singular originally-made assumption of some emptiness existence, the emptiness, which is un-
thinkable, and which name is an empty multitude. All the further building is an algorithmic process, having been formalized 
in Zermelo-Frenkel set theory. See Badiou A. Being and Event. London,2005.
3 Such a point of view remarkably coincides with the way, Leibnitz defined the monad, and precisely, as a metaphysical centre, 
allotted with perception and striving. Perception [percipio] is a seizing of the single in much [repetition], but there are no two 
identical perceptions, as far as each monad strives for a better perception, which is strictly defined by its own, unique aspira-
tion [conatus] to be this way and not the other [difference]. And in this sense, monad is causa sui.
4 For the levels of description and computer systems in detail, see D. Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, and Bach. Samara, 2000.
5 In order to win in this «informational» war it is significant that there must be some sort of immunity in the в phenotype of 
même. For example, the conception of belief is in highest degree insensitive to any rational and critical consideration, which 
could think this concept to be dangerous or false. The same is true in reference to the theory of conspiration, the unconscious, 
medicine, knowledge and etc.
6 See in detail:  Sheehan E.L. The Mocking Memes: A Basis for Automated Intelligence.
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pattern. And these body’s old systems can make 
the nervous system, more or less abruptly, do 
necessary actions. It means that, if precisely the 
communication demands make the subject make 
his categorical chose, than it (chose) would cause 
some discrepancies with the necessity. These 
discrepancies’ origin is identical to those, which 
we may observe while choosing an answer in a 
badly-composed test, when we are to choose the 
lesser evil. The subject solves the problem of 
taxonomy of those spheres, where the nature has 
not drawn any visible division lines with the help 
of approximating fantasizing [productive ability 
of imagination]. He gives names and predicates 
to his rather vaguely realized inclinations so, as if 
they are governed by precisely and categorically 
expressed targets and a certain plan of actions. 
It means that, understanding turns out to be 
problematic not only on the level of expression 
(understanding of others and by others), but 
already on the level of imagination (understanding 
of oneself), or, in other words, both in speech and 
in thinking.
So, I am closed again, but this time the truth 
and any utmost bases of my existence cannot 
become known by their definition. I can really 
know nothing. On the other hand, nobody keeps me 
from acting, i.e. from making effects. Moreover, I 
am free to make any action and freely estimate 
[call] the produced effect1. In fact, with necessity 
it would be always a surface effect. And it will be 
already not an announcing, but a testing action. I 
may insist and continue my action (if I do not die 
of course, or feel any other kind of discomfort, 
which will not do for me), but at any further stage 
I can alter it by means of making it just a little 
different from the previous variant, or radically 
changing my behavior or the way of thinking. 
In the last variant we may say that it has been a 
revelation or a sudden clarification, intuition – 
or whatever. Even such a chaotic strategy can 
become an algorithm and «grow into a habit». As 
Bergson said, the form of a habit or the habit to 
fall into habits is ethical by its essence and is good 
by its form2. Moreover, it is quite clear that life on 
the whole will strive for realizing of all its possible 
strategies3. As far as none of the possibilities must 
1 The year of publishing of Leibnitz’s «Combinatory Art» (1666)is considered by the modern mathematical logic to be the year 
of its birth, though, it could have been as well 1308 – the year of creation of «Ars magna» - the most fundamental work of 
Raimondus Lullius. He suggested the method, which consisted of purely mechanic combining of notions. Actually, Lullius 
expressed the idea of a logical machine, which later would be spoken about by Leibnitz and which would be reconstructed 
by W. S. Jevons in XIX century. Lullius’s «logical machine» is a mechanism, consisting of four concentric circles and three 
inscribed triangles - all of them rotating round one common centre. Alphabet is written on the circles and each letter has six 
meanings, notions, definitions, and features, thus, while circles and triangles rotate, notions, being taken at random, combine 
with each other and form various combinations. All this happen purely mechanically and later we are only to show the mean-
ing or meaninglessness of the obtained combinations. Thus, in his method Raimondus Lullius saw a general guidance for 
disclosing of everything, what could be researched, defined, differentiated and proved in any object.
2 i.e. it possesses the formal necessity of categorical imperative. (Quotations from G.Deleuze. Differentiation and Repeating. 
St.Petersburg, 1998. P. 16).
3 It is well known that at present time there has been left none of any utopia projects, having been created by humanists of the 
Renaissance epoch and which have failed to be this or that way realized or checked.
 Slavoj Zizek presents a curious illustration of such a «machinery» generation of possible truths. In his article «Cyberspace, or 
Unbearable Closure of Being» he writes: «if we say: “forget about the other world, catch your time, enjoy yourself here and 
now, this is your single life!” – It will sound profoundly. If we say right the opposite (“do not let them catch yourself in the 
trap of earthian, illusory pleasures of this life; money, power, passions – all this will return to dust – think about eternity!”) 
-- It will also sound profoundly. If we combine these both maxims (“Get into eternity, live the way, as if there an entire eter-
nity before you!”), we shall get one more piece of wisdom. And the opposite sounds not lesser wise: “do not try to combine 
the earthian and the eternal, humbly put up with the fact that it is impossible to combine the earthian and the celestial!” and 
finally, when we are tired of all these rearrangements, we come to the conclusion: “life is an enigma, do not try to find out its 
secrets, enjoy the beauty of this incomprehensible mystery!” and this summary will be not at all wiser, than the opposite one: 
“ do not let them deceive yourself by false secrets, life is very simple – life is that, what it is, and nothing else”. Besides, we 
may combine its incomprehensibility with simplicity: “the last impenetrable mystery of life is in its utmost simplicity, in that 
simple fact, that it exists...»
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be lost in the best of all the possible worlds, and 
this is exactly the reason why to live in such a 
world is far from being the best piece of luck. 
But it is not the problem of Raimondus Lullius’s 
machine. 
